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Australian Data Breach Notification: Avoiding the 
State/Federal Overlap 
 
Mark Burdon,∗ Paul von Nessen,† Jason Reid∗ and Bill 
Lane∗
 
 
Mandatory data breach notification has become a matter of 
increasing concern for law reformers. In Australia, this issue was recently 
addressed as part of a comprehensive review of privacy law conducted by 
the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) which recommended a 
uniform national regime for protecting personal information applicable to 
both the public and private sectors. As in all federal systems, the 
distribution of powers between central and state governments poses 
problems for national consistency. In the authors’ view, a uniform 
approach to mandatory data breach notification has greater merit than a 
‘jurisdiction specific’ approach epitomized by US state-based laws. The 
US response has given rise to unnecessary overlaps and inefficiencies as 
demonstrated by a review of different notification triggers and encryption 
safe harbors. Reviewing the US response, the authors conclude that a 
uniform approach to data breach notification is inherently more efficient. 
1. Introduction 
Australia, like the United States, operates on a federal system of government, 
with powers distributed between the central, Commonwealth government and those of 
the six states under the Australian Constitution.  When the Australian Commonwealth 
was established in 1901, the framers of the Australian Constitution sought guidance 
about an appropriate federal system from the United States1
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1 The effect of the Australian constitutional framers is neatly summarized in R. v Kirby 
ex parte The Boilermakers Soc. of Austl. (Boilermakers), (1956) 94 CLR 254 at 275: 
Probably the most striking achievement of the framers of the Australian 
instrument of government was the successful combination of the British system 
of parliamentary government containing an executive responsible to the 
legislature with American federalism. 
  
Commonwealth.2 As a consequence, the Australian Constitution includes many 
provisions modeled on, or adapted from those found in the United States Constitution.3
The division of powers under the Australian Constitution, like those in other 
federated systems, is often explained by historic justifications, based upon geopolitical 
realities of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. In that respect, developments of the 
modern era pose challenges not foreseen in past years. This is obvious in relation to 
phenomena such as the emergence of integrated financial markets and rapid 
developments in information technology and infrastructure, all of which result in the 
continuing diffusion of regulatory power. The manner in which federal systems must 
adapt in response to challenges of this nature is evident, for example, in the field of 
corporations law, where Australia, after protracted efforts, managed to achieve a uniform 
legal approach, based on a consensus forged between the federal and state governments. 
The developing area of information privacy law presents a similar challenge. 
  
Bearing in mind the legislative constraints imposed by a federal system of 
government, this paper considers the pitfalls involved in a legal response to data 
breaches which is based on a narrow, ‘jurisdiction by jurisdiction’ legislative approach. 
By contrasting US experience with the manner in which the issue is being addressed in 
Australia, the authors contend that, at least for Australia, one voice rather than many is 
more likely to provide optimal solutions in relation to mandatory data breach 
notification. 
 
2. Australian Privacy Regulation Developments 
In Australia, mandatory data breach notification has been addressed as a 
component of privacy law reform. Currently, the federal Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
(hereafter “the Privacy Act”) regulates the handling and use of personal information in 
those spheres in which the Commonwealth parliament can legislate – principally, the 
federal public sector (including that of the Australian Capital Territory) and the private 
sector.  In its original form, the Act established a set of Information Privacy Principles 
(IPPs), modeled on OECD guidelines,4 to regulate the handling of personal information 
by those government departments and agencies to which the Act applied. The Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner was also established to oversee and regulate their 
implementation. Later, in 1990, the Act was amended to extend these privacy safeguards 
to an area of the private sector concerned with consumer credit reporting.5 By further 
amendment in 2000, the Act was extended to all private sector organizations which were 
made subject to a set of privacy principles designated as the National Privacy Principles 
(NPPs).6
                                                          
2 See QUICK, AND GARRAN, ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN 
COMMONWEALTH (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1901). 
 
3 See HUNT, AMERICAN PRECEDENTS IN AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION (Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1930). 
4 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], Guidelines on the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/ 18/0,2340,es_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
5 PRIVACY AMENDMENT ACT 1990 (Cth) (Austrl.). 
6 PRIVACY AMENDMENT (PRIVATE SECTOR) ACT 2000 (Cth) (Austrl). 
  
However, in 2006, following further concerns expressed about diminishing 
privacy protection7 - and consistent with international developments, the then Attorney-
General of Australia, the Hon. Philip Ruddock, requested the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC) to undertake a review of the federal Privacy Act to ascertain 
whether it continued to provide an effective framework for the protection of privacy in 
Australia. In terms of its regulation of personal information, the Privacy Act does not 
seek to cover the field - each Australian state and territory also has legislation or 
administrative guidelines, principally for the regulation of its own public sector. And 
state-based inquiries similar to that requested of the ALRC have also been, or are being, 
conducted by the Victorian Law Reform Commission8 and the New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission.9
Referring to this federal/state overlap of responsibility in Australia, the ALRC 
pointedly noted: 
  
This creates confusion for individual consumers, who cannot always be 
expected to know whether an agency is a federal, state or territory body or, as 
a result, where to go for guidance on which privacy laws apply or where to 
take concerns and complaints. 
In relation to the Privacy Act, the ALRC commenced its inquiry in 2006, 
provided its initial findings in 2007,10 and in May, 2008 gave its final recommendations 
in Report 108, For Your Information: Australian Privacy and Practice.11 The ALRC’s 
recommendations are extensive. Many propose modernizing and harmonizing the 
privacy obligations already applicable in their previous form to private and public sector 
organizations. One major recommendation, for example, concerns the introduction into 
the Australian privacy legislation of the Uniform Privacy Principles applicable to 
governmental agencies and private organizations alike.12 These new principles would 
deal with collection of personal information,13
                                                          
7 AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, Review of Privacy: Issues Paper (Australian 
Law Reform Commission. 2007).  
 notification that the collection has 
8 VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, WORKPLACE PRIVACY: FINAL REPORT (2005). 
9 NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER 1, INVASION 
OF PRIVACY (NSWLRC CP 1). The final report is expected soon. 
10 AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, Review of Australian Privacy Law 
(Australian Law Reform Commission. 2007). 
11 AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, FOR YOUR INFORMATION: AUSTRALIAN 
PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE (Australian Law Reform Commission. 2008) hereafter 
[PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE]. 
12 AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, Review of Privacy: Issues Paper, 34. 
Recommendation 18–2 states: 
The Privacy Act should be amended to consolidate the current Information 
Privacy Principles and National Privacy Principles into a single set of privacy 
principles, referred to in this Report as the model Unified Privacy Principles. 
13 Id. at 91-2. The proposed Uniform Privacy Principles (UPP) in relevant part provides: 
2.1 An agency or organisation must not collect personal information unless it is 
necessary for one or more of its functions or activities. 
2.2 An agency or organisation must collect personal information only by lawful 
and fair means and not in an unreasonably intrusive way. 
2.3 If it is reasonable and practicable to do so, an agency or organisation must 
collect personal information about an individual only from that individual. 
  
occurred,14 the permissible use of such information,15 and the accuracy16
As a result of the overlap of Commonwealth and State legislation, the ALRC also 
indicated that this continuing problem should be addressed. In its view, there would be 
great benefits across the board from adopting a common approach to privacy protection 
in all Australian jurisdictions. To achieve greater consistency, the ALRC recommended 
that the Privacy Act should apply to the federal public sector and the private sector to the 
exclusion of state and territory laws covering such matters. Further, the ALRC 
recommended that the Commonwealth, state and territory governments establish an 
intergovernmental cooperative scheme, under which the states and territories would 
enact legislation to regulate the handling of personal information in each state’s and 
territory’s public sector by adopting the key elements of the Privacy Act—such as the 
same set of privacy principles, important definitions, data breach notification schemes 
and other key provisions. 
 of such 
information.  
The Australian model of one uniform approach to privacy legislation is similar to 
that used to bring in uniform corporate and securities laws from 1990 (ultimately 
resulting in complete federalization of that area of law). The disadvantages of multiple 
approaches to privacy regulation can be seen in the United States, where both the 
Federal government and the various states have dealt with the concept of data breach 
notification. In consequence of this dispersal of responsibility, both the exemption for 
encryption of data from the data breach statutes and the notification requirements under 
                                                                                                                                               
2.4 If an agency or organisation receives unsolicited personal information about 
an individual from someone else, it must either:  
 (a) if lawful and reasonable to do so, destroy the information as soon as 
practicable without using or disclosing it except for the purpose of determining 
whether the information should be retained; or  
 (b) comply with all relevant provisions in the UPPs that apply to the 
information in question, as if the agency or organisation had actively collected 
the information.  
2.5 In addition to the other requirements in UPP 2, an agency or organisation 
must not collect sensitive information about an individual unless:  
 (a) the individual has consented… 
14 Id at 93. Uniform Privacy Principle 3, Notification, provides that when an agency or 
organisation collects personal information about an individual, it should take reasonable 
steps to notify the individual of the collection of the information, the purposes of its 
collection and the types of organisation to whom such information is likely to be 
disclosed. It also provides for access and correction (further dealt with in Uniform 
Privacy Principle 9) as well as complaint mechanisms. 
15 Id. at 94. Uniform Privacy Principle 5, Use and Disclosure, indicates that an agency or 
organisation must not use or disclose personal information about an individual for a 
purpose other than the primary purpose of collection with certain exceptions. These 
exceptions include related secondary purposes which would be reasonably expected, 
those for which the individual has consented, disclosures to protect the individual life, 
health or safety or the public health or safety, and, under prescribed circumstances, to 
enforcement agencies. 
16 Id. at 97. Uniform Privacy Principle 7, Data Quality, states that an agency or 
organisation must take reasonable steps to make certain that the personal information it 
collects, uses or discloses is accurate, complete, up-to-date and relevant. 
  
the various statutes indicate a complexity and inefficiency which the Australian proposal 
(nascent though it is) may avoid these complexities if the ALRC’s recommendation on 
intergovernmental cooperation is adopted.  
 
3. Data Security and Data Breach Notification – the Uniform 
Australian Approach 
Among the most significant of the recommendations concerning privacy in the 
ALRC report are those relating to the security of data and the obligations which arise 
where that security has been compromised. The proposed Uniform Privacy Principles 
continue the obligation on data holders to maintain security over the personal 
information they hold,17
An agency or organization must take reasonable steps to: protect the 
personal information it holds from misuse and loss and from unauthorized 
access, modification or disclosure.
 indicating that: 
18
Concern was also expressed for the need for a protocol when the security of data 
had been breached. In early 2008, concurrent with the ALRC inquiry into the state of the 
Privacy Act, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner released a consultation paper on a 
Voluntary Information Security Breach Notification Guide to enable organizations and 
agencies to respond effectively to an information security breach.
 
19 While the voluntary 
guidelines could operate immediately for those willing to adopt them, the Privacy 
Commissioner also supported the inclusion of provisions to the Privacy Act that would 
require organizations to advise affected individuals of the breach of their personal 
information in certain circumstances.20 The ALRC clearly took on board the suggestions 
of the Privacy Commissioner, devoting a whole section of its final report to data breach 
notification and the benefits of the various legislative models.21 Moreover, the ALRC 
confirmed its discussion paper proposals, recommending that the Privacy Act be 
amended to include a new part on data breach notification. The proposal reads as 
follows:22
Recommendation 51–1 The Privacy Act should be amended to include a 
new Part on data breach notification, to provide as follows: 
 
(a) An agency or organization is required to notify the Privacy Commissioner 
and affected individuals when specified personal information has been, or is 
reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person and 
                                                          
17 PRIVACY ACT 1988 (CTH) (Austrl.) S 14, IPP 4; SCH 3, NPP 4. 
18 AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 98. Uniform Privacy 
Principle 8.1(a). Part (b) provides: 
An agency or organisation must take reasonable steps to: (b) destroy or 
render non-identifiable personal information if it is no longer needed for any 
purpose for which it can be used or disclosed under the UPPs and retention is 
not required or authorised by or under law. 
19 AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PRIVACY COMMISSIONER 
CONSULTATION PAPER—DRAFT VOLUNTARY INFORMATION SECURITY BREACH 
NOTIFICATION GUIDE (2008).  
20 Id. at 18 (stating that the voluntary guidelines are not intended to be a substitute for 
further legislative action, but are aimed at encouraging voluntary action to address these 
issues while legislative change is under consideration). 
21 AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 1696. 
22 Id at 1696-7. 
  
the agency, organization or Privacy Commissioner believes that the 
unauthorized acquisition may give rise to a real risk of serious harm to any 
affected individual. 
(b) The definition of ‘specified personal information’ should include both 
personal information and sensitive personal information, such as information 
that combines a person’s name and address with a unique identifier, such as a 
Medicare or account number. 
(c) In determining whether the acquisition may give rise to a real risk of 
serious harm to any affected individual, the following factors should be taken 
into account: 
(i) whether the personal information was encrypted adequately; and 
(ii) whether the personal information was acquired in good faith by an 
employee or agent of the agency or organization where the agency or 
organization was otherwise acting for a purpose permitted by the Privacy Act 
(provided that the personal information is not used or subject to further 
unauthorized disclosure). 
(d) An agency or organization is not required to notify an affected individual 
where the Privacy Commissioner considers that notification would not be in 
the public interest or in the interests of the affected individual. 
(e) Failure to notify the Privacy Commissioner of a data breach as required 
by the Act may attract a civil penalty. 
While the data breach statute is likely to evolve as a result of international 
experience, it is probable that one data breach statute, whatever its eventual form, will 
apply throughout Australia. This would make it far easier for individuals to understand 
the general rules that apply to personal information regardless of whether it is being 
handled by a private organization, a federal agency, or a state or territory agency. In 
contrast to the way the United States requirements have evolved, discussed below, a 
uniform and cooperative data breach notification statute enacted in similar terms by the 
Commonwealth government and the States would ease the compliance burden 
significantly and reduce costs for business.  
 
4. US State Law Notification Triggers & Encryption Safe 
Harbors 
The difficulties that arise from state/federal overlaps in data breach notification 
become readily visible upon an examination of the development of state-based 
notification triggers and encryption exemptions which demonstrate the plethora of 
statutory constructions in existence. 
 
4.1 Notification Triggers 
A key difference and point of contention between US state-based data breach 
notification laws regards notification triggers. The notification trigger is the statutory 
requirement that indicates when and in what circumstance notification is required from 
an organization. A majority of state-based laws are largely based on the Californian 
model23
                                                          
23 See Sean C Honeywill, Data Security and Data Breach Notification for Financial 
Institutions, 10 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE 269(2006). 
 but some state laws have adopted different types of notification trigger that can 
  
be broadly categorized into two types: acquisition based and risk-based triggers that 
represent differing approaches to notification.24
Acquisition based triggers, such as the California law, have a relatively low 
‘triggering threshold’ that triggers an obligation to notify when an organization has 
suffered, or believes it has suffered a breach.
  
25 Accordingly, notification may be required 
even when there is no actual evidence of data having been acquired.26 Jones contends 
that data breach notification laws based on an acquisition trigger are more consumer 
oriented because broad notification means that consumers are made aware of potential 
data breaches and can therefore take action to mitigate potential harms before they 
arise.27 Acquisition-based triggers therefore set a minimum threshold for notification in 
relation to identity theft risks.28 Risk-based triggers, on the other hand, set a different 
standard as these triggers only require notification in situations where a risk assessment 
determines that a risk of harm exists to consumers.29 Jones contends that risk-based 
triggers are business oriented because they generally require the corporate entity to make 
a determination whether a risk of harm will or is reasonably likely to arise.30
The distinction between an acquisition-based trigger and a risk-based trigger goes 
to the heart of data breach notification’s rationale and it also signifies some major 
differences between different approaches. Acquisition-based triggers employ the 
regulatory tool of reputational sanction.
  
31
                                                          
24 See Michael E Jones, Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private 
Sectors, 3 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 555, 
562 (2007). See also Martin G Bingisser, Data Privacy and Breach Reporting: 
Compliance with Varying State Laws, 4 SHIDLER JOURNAL OF LAW, COMMERCE & 
TECHNOLOGY (2008) (defining the distinction as “strict vs. flexible”); Prischia M. 
Regan, Federal Security Breach Notifications: Politics and Approaches, 24 BERKELEY 
TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 1103, 1118 (2009) (ascertaining that trigger choice has also 
been a political choice). 
 Notification is used as a threat held over the 
25 See Jones, surpa note 24, at 562 (regarding the elements of acquisition based triggers 
that are deemed to favor consumer protection because notification is not left to the 
breached entity); Paul M Schwartz & Edward J Janger, Notification of Data Security 
Breaches, 105 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 913, 933 (2007) (commenting the Californian 
law “is marked by a low threshold for notification”). 
26 Jones, surpa note 24, at 562. 
27 Id. at 563.  
28 See Samuel Lee, Breach Notification Laws: Notification Requirements and Data 
Safeguarding Now Apply to Everyone, Including Entrepreneurs, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL 
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 125, 132 (2006).  
29 See FRED H. CATE, Information Security Breaches: Looking Back and Thinking 
Ahead(2008), at 
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/2308/Information_Security_
Breaches_Cate.pdf., 13; MICHAEL TURNER, Towards a Rational Personal Data Breach 
Notification Regime, 14 (2006), at 
http://www.infopolicy.org/files/downloads/data_breach.pdf. 
30 Jones, surpa note 24, at 563. 
31 See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 25, at 947 (regarding the role and failure of 
reputational sanction); Jane Winn, Are 'Better' Security Breach Notification Laws 
Possible?, 24 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 1133, 1143 (2009) (the shaming 
function of data breach notification is “direct and concrete”).  
  
head of organizations to improve information security measures or else suffer the 
embarrassment and humiliation of public notification.32 Notification therefore fulfils 
both an ex ante purpose, through the encouragement of adequate information security 
practices to minimize data breaches before they arise,33 and an ex post purpose to 
provide consumers with information in order that they can take action to mitigate 
themselves.34 The rationale of acquisition-based notification thus makes in-built 
judgments about corporate failures to secure personal information and the effectiveness 
of notification as a remedy.35 
For the purposes of this article, our interest briefly focuses on the different 
standards that exist as to what triggers notification under a risk-based trigger as this lays 
the foundation for a deeper analysis of encryption safe harbors. For example, some US 
state-based data breach notification laws require a reasonable likelihood that harm may 
arise36 where others require a significant or material real risk of identity theft37 or a 
reasonable likelihood of substantial economic loss.38
 
 Some risk-based triggers therefore 
operate on higher standards for notification than others which complicate compliance 
requirements for nationwide companies. This point is magnified further by an 
examination of US state-based encryption safe harbors which moves concerns from 
compliance complications to the general effectiveness of statutory constructions in 
relation to data breach notification. 
 
                                                          
32 See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 25, at 936-937 (regarding the essential role of 
reputational sanction in acquisition-based trigger laws). See also James T Graves, 
Minnesota's PCI Law: A Small Step on the Path to a Statutory Duty of Data Security 
Due Care, 34 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW 1115, 1120 (2008) (contesting that data 
breach notification law does not adequately deal with corporate information security 
measures); Jacob W Schneider, Preventing Data Breaches: Alternative Approaches to 
Deter Negligent Handling of Consumer Data, 15 BOSTON UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF 
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW 279, 285 (2009) (claiming the reputational detriment has 
little, long-term practical impact upon corporations). 
33 See Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data 
Protection: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW 
JOURNAL 1061(2009) (regarding the ex ante role of security protections to reduce the 
numbers of future data breaches). 
34 See Id. at 1072-1074 (regarding an overview of information disclosure measures as an 
ex post mechanism in data breach notification laws); See also Graves, supra note 32, at 
1122 (questioning the effectiveness of the ex ante elements). 
35 See Jonathan J Darrow & Stephen J Lichtenstein "Do You Really Need My Social 
Security Number?" Data Collection Practices in the Digital Age, 10 NORTH CAROLINA 
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 1, 50 (2008) (in relation to the time and cost of 
repairing data breach damage). 
36 See e.g. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (Michie 2005); FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 
(2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3071 (West 2005). 
37 See e.g. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 (2006); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3501 
(2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS 93H §1 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 (2007); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-1 
(2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-42-101 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 895.507 (2006). 
38 See e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-7501 (2007).  
  
4.2 Encryption Safe Harbors 
The use of an encryption safe harbor has been an integral element of data breach 
notification laws because encryption has been used by legislators to define notification 
parameters for organizations. Put simply, as applied in most data breach notification 
laws, encrypted personal information does not trigger an obligation to notify because the 
information that has been acquired without authorization is secure and therefore does not 
pose an identity theft risk. Jones has identified three types of encryption safe harbor.39 
Exemptions exempt notification based on the notion that encrypted data is secure and 
does not pose a risk. Rebuttable presumptions create a presumption that encrypted data is 
secure and unauthorized acquisitions do not have to be notified. However, this 
presumption can be rebutted by facts to the contrary. Factor-based analysis requires 
breached organizations to demonstrate that the encryption adopted was effective before 
notification is exempted. Our research indicates that all but two US state-based laws 
have exemption type encryption safe harbors.40
We identified five conceptual and operational layers that we used to categorize 19 
key statutory terms that are currently being used in state-based encryption exemptions. 
Table 1, below, outlines the layers, statutory terms and their identifiers (e.g. letters A to 
S). The layers are conceptual and operational categorizations of different security related 
requirements that classify statutory terms into broad themes that permeate throughout 
state-based encryption exemptions. The terms are representative of an array of 
definitions that are essentially used to define different exemption elements and the range 
of different definitions is highlighted in brackets in the Key Statutory Terms column.  
  
Table 1. Conceptual/Operational Layers and Key Statutory Terms  
 
Layer ID Key Statutory Terms (alternate definitions in brackets) 
[1]  
Californian 
Model 
A Requirements of Cal Civil Code 1729(a): unencrypted personal 
information (personal information is not encrypted; Not secured by 
encryption). 
   
 
 
[2] Encryption 
Definitions 
B Encryption is an algorithmic process that transforms data, 
unreadable or unusable without confidential process or key. 
C Encryption is an algorithmic process that transforms data where 
there is a low probability of assigning meaning without a 
confidential process or key. 
D Encryption is the transformation of data using 128 bits or higher: 
low probability of meaning without confidential process or key. 
E Encryption is the disguising of data using generally accepted 
practices. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
F Data protected by another method to make it unreadable or 
unusable (Any method secures data: unreadable or unusable; 
Protected by any method: unreadable or unusable; Secured by 
another method that renders data unreadable or unusable; Securing 
by another method; rendering completely unreadable or unusable; 
Data protected by other methods that make data: unreadable or 
                                                          
39 Jones, supra note 24. 
40 Exceptions being D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3851 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-
12-501 (Michie 2007). 
  
Layer ID Key Statutory Terms (alternate definitions in brackets) 
[3]  
Other 
Methods 
unusable). 
G Data transformed by another method or technology to make 
unreadable or unusable (Any method or technology alters data to 
make unreadable or unusable). 
H Data transformed by another method of technology that makes 
electronic data unreadable or unusable. 
I Data altered by any method or technology to make it unreadable 
(Altered in a manner that renders data unreadable). 
J Data is not rendered unusable through other methods that 
compromise the security, confidentiality or integrity the data (Data 
elements are not rendered unusable). 
   
 
[4] Redaction  
K Redacted is undefined. 
L Redaction is defined as to render or truncate specified forms of 
numerical data to make unreadable. 
M Redaction is defined as to alter or truncate specified forms of 
numerical data to make unreadable. 
   
 
 
 
 
[5]  
Key 
Management 
N Data is encrypted and the encryption key was acquired. 
O Data is encrypted and encryption key was accessed or acquired. 
P Data is secured and encryption key or password or other means 
necessary for reading or using the data was acquired. 
Q Data is not considered encrypted if it is acquired in combination 
with any required key, security code, access code or password that 
would permit access. 
R Encrypted electronic data is acquired or used and the confidential 
process or key that is capable of compromising the security, 
confidentiality, or integrity of personal information.  
S Security breach involves person with access to encryption key. 
US state-based encryption exemptions adopt one of two core definitional 
approaches. The first is whether the state legislation attempts to explicitly define 
encryption or whether the exemption is of a non-explicit variety as based on the 
Californian law. Layer 1, Californian Model represents the latter and Layer 2, 
Encryption Definitions detail different attempts to define encryption. The complexity of 
different definitions varies from the straightforward41 to the technically specific.42 
Within Layer 2, there is a majority definition of encryption in operation43
                                                          
41 See e.g. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 10, §§ 210-B-1346 (West 2007) (“encryption is the 
disguising of data using generally accepted practices”).  
 but encrypted 
42 See e.g. MASS. GEN. LAWS 93H §1 (2007) (“encryption is the transformation of 
data using 128 bits or higher to which encrypted data has a low probability of meaning 
without access to a confidential process or key”). 
43 The basis of the majority definition is “encryption is an algorithmic process that 
transforms data.”  
  
data is defined in two ways: (1) data that is unreadable or unusable44 or (2) data that has 
a low probability of meaning without access to a confidential process or key.45 Layer 3, 
Other Methods, details statutory terminology that is often adopted in state-based laws 
which provides for the use of methods46 or methods and technologies47 or technologies 
only,48 in addition to encryption, that renders data unreadable or unusable. There are also 
variations that entail differences between data that is unreadable only49 and unusable 
only.50 However, these laws generally provide no indication as to what methods or 
technologies would equate to encryption. Layer 4, Redaction, highlights those states that 
have extended their encryption exemption to also cover redaction. Again, as above, there 
is a difference between those states that attempt to define redaction51 and those that do 
not.52
                                                          
44 See MASS. GEN. LAWS 93H §1 (2007); ARI REV. STAT. § 44-7501 (2007); HAW. 
REV. STAT §§ 487N-1 (2007); IOWA CODE § 715C.1 (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 
407.1500 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-801 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-60 
(2005); 9 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 2430 (2007). 
 Finally, Layer 5, Key Management, details those states that also require some form 
of security in relation to decryption keys, passwords or other codes that would enable an 
45 See MD. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3501 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 (2007); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-
C:19 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (Michie 2008); W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-
2A-101 (2008). 
46 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 (2006); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3501 (2008); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-42-101 (2006); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-7501 (2007); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 (2009); 9 VT. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 2430 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (Michie 2008); W. VA. 
CODE §§ 46A-2A-101 (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (2006) (2006); IND. 
CODE §§ 24-4.9-3-1 (2006). 
47 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163 (West 
2006); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-30-01 (2005). 
48 See MINN. STAT. § 325E.61 (2006). 
49 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. § 895.507 (2006); 
IOWA CODE § 715C.1 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-801 (2006); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 45.48.010 (Michie 2009). 
50 See OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.600 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (Law Co-op 
2009). 
51 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 (2007); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-7501 
(2007); IOWA CODE § 715C.1 (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 (2009); NEB. 
REV. STAT. §§ 87-801 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-60 (2005); 9 VT. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 2430 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (Michie 2008); W. VA. CODE 
§§ 46A-2A-101 (2008); IND. CODE §§ 24-4.9-3-1 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 
45.48.010 (Michie 2009). 
52 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (Michie 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
51:3071 (West 2005); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3501 (2008); WIS. STAT. § 895.507 
(2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 10, §§ 210-B-1346 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 6-1-716 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.600 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 
(Law Co-op 2009); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-911 (2005); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
530/1 (2005). 
  
unauthorized person to decrypt acquired personal data.53 One state also includes the 
situation where a person who had access to decryption keys was also involved in the 
breach.54
As highlighted above, a layering process starts from a foundational layer.
 
55 There 
are four groups of encryption exemption that start with the Californian law, beginning 
with Term A and the broad-ranging exemption featuring “unencrypted personal 
information”. In 2005, the next two states to enact data breach laws, North Dakota and 
Georgia, followed the Californian law but added another layer to the exemption based on 
the other methods (A,G)56 and the redaction (A,K)57 layers respectively. The Georgia 
exemption was subsequently copied by Arkansas58 in August 2005 and Illinois59 and 
Louisiana60 in January 2006. In December 2005, the New York law was then enacted 
and added a term from the key management layer to its definition of personal 
information (A,N).61 Minnesota is then the first Californian based exemption to include 
terms from all three layers which are different to those previously adopted (A,H,P).62
The second layering effect then starts to become more apparent. In early 2006, for 
the first time, we have several states that layer an additional term over another additional 
term. For example, the Colorado law
  
63 adds a term from the other methods layer to a 
pre-existing redaction layer (A,F,K) as does the Wisconsin law (A,I,K).64 This process 
then continues throughout the incorporation of the Californian law until the most recent 
laws to be enacted in Alaska (A,J,K)65 and South Carolina (A,I,M).66 In January 2007, 
the Utah law also adds Colorado’s term from the other methods layer but does not 
incorporate the redaction term - a different element from the other methods layer (A,F).67
                                                          
53 See MASS. GEN. LAWS 93H §1 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-60 (2005); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-C:19 (2007); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61 (2006); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 646A.600 (2007). 
 
The Californian based exemptions use a wide range of terms from different layers but 
only repeat certain terms infrequently, particularly term K. 
54 See 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2303 (2006). 
55 It should also be noted that some states simply adopted the Californian notification 
trigger word for word and they therefore have identical encryption exemptions. Those 
state laws are: FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-1 (2005); 6 
DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 12B-101 (2005); IDAHO CODE § 28-51-104 (Michie 2006); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 603A.010 (2006); 
OKLA. STAT. § 74-3113.1 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2101 (2005); TEX. 
BUS. & COMM. CODE. §§ 48.001 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010 (2005). 
56 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-30-01 (2005).  
57 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-911 (2005). 
58 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (Michie 2005). 
59 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/1 (2005). 
60 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3071 (West 2005). 
61 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163 (West 2006). 
62 MINN. STAT. § 325E.61 (2006).  
63 COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (2006). 
64 WIS. STAT. § 895.507 (2006). 
65 ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (Michie 2009). 
66 S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (Law Co-op 2009). 
67 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-42-101 (2006). 
  
The same type of foundational and supplementary layering is evident amongst 
those states that have attempted to define encryption. However, it is more common for 
certain terms to be copied and used with different terms from the same layer. This 
promotes a clustering effect where different states adopt clusters of the same set of 
terms. The foundational base of the majority of these states represents the difference 
between terms B and C, and a choice based on either the North Carolinian68 or the Ohio 
law69. The North Carolina law appeared relatively early in the development of 
encryption exemptions following enactment in December 2005. The law was also 
enacted with terms from the redaction and key management layers (B,L,O). In March 
2006, the Nebraska law used Term B as the basis for its exemption but then added 
different terms from the other methods and redaction layers (B,I,M). Vermont (B,F,L)70 
and Arizona (B,F,M)71 then follow suit in January 2007 but again use a combination of 
different terms. The clustering effect then becomes visible as the North Carolina 
exemption was followed by Hawaii (B,L,O);72 Iowa(B,I,M)73 follows Nebraska and in 
2009 Missouri (B,F,M)74 follows Arizona. Separate from the other Term B states is 
Oregon which is the only exemption that includes terms from all three additional layers 
(B,J,K,N) which have been adopted from the Californian based exemptions.75
A similar effect is also identifiable in the development of the Term C states. 
Those states that have adopted Term C as their foundational base began with Ohio in 
February 2006 which also implemented terms from the redaction and other methods 
layers at the onset of enactment (C,I,M). The Ohio law also adopted a different 
definition of redaction to the Californian based exemptions and Term B based states 
(M).
 
76 Pennsylvania77 then adopts the same definition of redaction but also includes a 
term from the key management later (C,M,S). Indiana78 then founds the most popular 
exemption amongst the Term C states that involves terms from the other methods and 
redaction layers (C,F,M) and is subsequently adopted by four other states.79 Finally, 
New Hampshire80 uses Term F with a key management term (C,F,Q) and Maryland81
 
 
uses Term F with a different redaction term (C,F,K).  
5. The US Approach – Many Hands 
We contend that the layering effect has had a detrimental effect regarding the 
coherent development of US state-based encryption exemptions. For example, different 
foundational layers set higher and lower standards as to what constitutes encryption. 
                                                          
68 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-60 (2005). 
69 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005). 
70 9 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 2430 (2007). 
71 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-7501 (2007). 
72 HAW. REV. STAT §§ 487N-1 (2007). 
73 IOWA CODE § 715C.1 (2008). 
74 MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 (2009). 
75 OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.600 (2007). 
76 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005). 
77 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2303 (2006). 
78 IND. CODE §§ 24-4.9-3-1 (2006). 
79 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 (2007); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (Michie 2008); W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-2A-101 (2008). 
80 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-C:19 (2007).  
81 MD. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3501 (2008). 
  
Those laws based on Term C state that encryption is an algorithmic process that 
transforms data where there is a low probability of assigning meaning without a 
confidential process or key. However, Term B uses the same terminology except that it 
has a higher standard namely, encrypted data is unreadable or unusable without access 
to a confidential process or key. The use of the phrase ‘low probability’ is different from 
‘unreadable or unusable’ because it is not an absolute (i.e. the data is either readable or 
usable or it is not). The use of low probability therefore connotes that encrypted data is 
never believed to be absolutely secure. Potential problems can arise for those laws that 
combine both elements such as when some of the Term C states use terms from the other 
methods layer based on unreadable or unusable.82 These laws effectively have two 
different operational standards with the other methods exemption operating at a higher 
level than the encryption exemption. The same applies to those Term B states, Nebraska 
and Iowa that have adopted North Carolina’s definition of encryption but have also 
adopted Ohio’s other methods term.83
We also identify a concern that arises with the use of Ohio’s other methods term 
(I). Ohio adopts a different other methods term from those states that subsequently 
adopted the law’s Term C foundation. Data can be considered for a safe harbor if it has 
been altered by a method or technology that makes it unreadable.
 
84 The use of a hash 
function is an important consideration in this regard. While it violates accepted best 
practice, a hash function is sometimes used to transform credit card numbers in a way 
that makes them unreadable. It could therefore potentially be considered as an 
appropriate method or technology for reliance upon a safe harbor. However, just because 
the hashed data is unreadable, it does not mean to say that it is unusable.85
The combination of encryption and redaction can also be problematic particularly 
for laws that do not attempt to define redaction. In its strict legal sense, the process of 
redaction refers to blacking out of words in hard copy documents to restrict the 
publication of sensitive information.
 With some 
additional analysis, unreadable data can still reveal useful information. The use of an 
exclusory term based on unreadable therefore sets a lower standard than is implied by 
unusable.  
86
                                                          
82 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 (2006); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3501 (2008); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-C:19 (2007); 
IND. CODE §§ 24-4.9-3-1 (2006).  
 The electronic equivalent of hard copy redaction 
is difficult to achieve as has been demonstrated in recent high-profile reported 
83 See e.g. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-801 (2006) and compare the definition of 
encryption at §87-802(3). 
84 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005).  
85 The data is still useable because if the same data is hashed it will produce the same 
output hash value. Hashed data is therefore susceptible to so called ‘dictionary attacks’. 
It the case of credit card numbers, a dictionary attack involves sequentially hashing all 
possible credit card numbers - any matches to the stored values reveals a valid credit 
card number. This is possible because a hash function does not require a secret key as an 
input to the function.  
86 See e.g. BRYAN A. GARNER & HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
(West 9th ed. ed. 2009). Redaction is defined as “The careful editing of a document, 
especially to remove confidential references or offensive material.” 
  
examples.87 Thus the application of redaction elements to electronic data is fraught with 
problems. Electronic data can be deleted but there is no non-reversible digital analogue 
of a black marker pen if the text remains present in the electronic file.88 Redaction 
therefore is presumably meant to take its lay definition which is “the action or process of 
revising or editing text especially in preparation for publication.”89 Support for this 
proposition can be found in state laws that have defined redaction as a process to render 
(or alter) or truncate data to make unreadable.90 However, whichever meaning is meant 
to be applied, a major problem nonetheless arises from the combination of redaction and 
encryption in an exemption because redaction is given the same weight as encryption 
when in many cases it should not be because it is trivially reversible. Guidance produced 
by the US Government’s Department of Health and Human Services in relation to 
security rules for the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
make it clear that redaction should not be considered as secure as encryption and should 
only be used with paper records.91
These differences highlight an ongoing debate that is currently taking place 
within the US data breach notification literature. One of the general criticisms of data 
breach notification laws, particularly US state-based laws is the extraordinary collection 
of statutory constructions in operation. For example, Picanso, whilst calling for the 
development of a uniform federal data breach law, highlights the compliance difficulties 
that have arisen for nationwide businesses due to use of different statutory language by 
state legislatures.
 Accordingly, the lower standard that redaction sets 
nullifies the higher standards offered by properly implemented encryption when 
combined together.  
92 However, as Picanso further points out, federal proposals have not 
been immune from this criticism either.93
                                                          
87 See JAIKUMAR VIJAYAN, TSA Posts Document on Airport Screening Procedures 
Online - Lawmakers Call Gaffe Shocking, Demand Invesitgation, Computerworld 
Security,(2009), at 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9141982/TSA_posts_document_on_airport_scr
eening_procedures_online. For example, the US Transport Security Administration 
published a highly sensitive document on the web that was supposedly redacted by 
drawing black boxes over the relevant text. However “PDF documents don't really care 
about the black box … and the actual content of the document is still in the file.”  
 Rode contests, with reference to the 
88 This is the case notwithstanding that it may not be displayed on screen or in printed 
versions of the document. However, if an electronic document is simply a scanned 
version of paper document that has been physically altered so that the redacted text is no 
longer visible, the redaction will be effective. 
89 The Oxford English Dictionary definition of redaction.  
90 See e.g. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 
(2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-
7501 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-501 (Michie 2007); IOWA CODE § 715C.1 
(2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-801 (2006); 9 
VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 2430 (2007); IND. CODE §§ 24-4.9-3-1 (2006). 
91 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 45 CFR PARTS 160 AND 164 - 
BREACH NOTIFICATION FOR UNSECURED PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION. (2009), 
42742  
92 Kathryn E Picanso, Protecting Information Security Under a Uniform Data Breach 
Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 355, 382 (2006).  
93 Id. at 382. 
  
Californian law, that the use of vague language will ultimately render the law useless in 
the face of continuing technological advances.94 This criticism does not just apply to the 
Californian law but a majority of state-based laws that are also based on the Californian 
definition of personal information. The use of vague language also creates a tendency 
toward over-regulation because a breached entity is likely to be overly cautious in terms 
of who gets notified due to legal uncertainty and the technical difficulties in ascertaining 
those individuals that may have been affected by the breach.95 Faulkner also contends 
that the lack of uniform definitions for the key elements of data breach notification96 is 
another major problem of US state-based laws. This problem is exacerbated because data 
breach notification laws are still in their infancy and have yet to be tested through the 
development of jurisprudential discourse.97
However, other authors assert that the development of the state-based laws has 
many positive attributes. For example, Schwartz contends that the state-based data 
breach notification laws were the first to recognize an area of regulatory significance 
whilst federal proposals have remained relatively inert.
 
98 Similarly, Garcia states that the 
laws are in effect an “experiment to generate new ideas, testing the range of state laws 
against the ongoing breaches” and differences should therefore be encouraged.99 As 
regards the use of different statutory language, Needles asserts that the development of 
state-based laws has permitted the inclusion of additional data protection measures 
through a process of layering.100 Thus states “have begun to layer affirmative data 
protection obligations over notification laws, requiring businesses in their jurisdictions to 
provide security measures for personally identifiable information.”101 This increases the 
states’ “current ability to layer proactive, protective measures over reactive, retributive 
measures [which] further enhances legislatures’ power to craft law to best suit states’ 
needs.”102
                                                          
94 Lilia Rode, Database Security Breach Notification Statutes: Does Placing the 
Responsibility on the True Victim Increase Data Security?, 43 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 
1597, 1622 (2007). 
 This layering process therefore entails the overlaying of additional security 
measures over a core foundational centre which means that states can tailor their data 
95 Id.  
96 For example, the concept of personal information in data breach notification laws 
refers to a combination of name in conjunction with other potentially personally 
identifying information. See e.g. CAL. CIV. CODE §.1789.29(e) (West 2003). Different 
states have used a combination of many different types of information. See e.g. Sara A. 
Needles, The Data Game: Learning to Love the State-Based Approach to Data Breach 
Notification Law, 88 North Carolina Law Review 267, 275 (2009). 
97 Brandon Faulkner, Hacking into Data Breach Notification Laws, 59 FLORIDA LAW 
REVIEW 1097, 1108 (2007). 
98 Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE LAW JOURNAL 902, 917 
(2009). 
99 Flora J Garcia, 'Data Protection, Breach Notification, and the Interplay Between State 
and Federal Law: The Experiments Need More Time' (2007) 17(3) FORDHAM 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL 693, 726. 
100 Needles. supra note 96, at 291. 
101 Id. at 292. 
102 Id. at 291. 
  
breach notification laws to align with their expectations regarding data protection and 
consumer protection measures.103
Our research findings highlight that the process of layering has been adopted 
extensively in the development of state-based exemptions. The use of conflicting 
statutory terminology is a problem that has been exacerbated by seemingly ad hoc 
development. The state-based laws were developed in a relatively short period of time 
and little emphasis seems to have been placed on testing or monitoring the effects of the 
laws. The result of has been the creation of a plethora of encryption exemptions. A ‘pick 
and mix’ mentality to legislative development is prevalent despite the fact that an 
untested choice of layer and foundational statutory term could have a negative impact on 
the overall utility and complexity of the adopted encryption exemption. Accordingly, in 
the case of state-based encryption exemptions, we would contend that the process of 
experimenting and layering has had a negative rather than positive effect. 
  
 
6. Conclusion 
The development of encryption safe harbors in US state-based data breach 
notification laws demonstrates the weaknesses of a non-uniformed approach. The 
plethora of definitions in operation needlessly complicates compliance for nationwide 
organizations. Some of these definitions are internally inconsistent and this appears to 
have been caused by the advent of a ‘pick and mix’ mentality. Some state legislatures 
have attempted to resolve concerns by developing more specific and developed 
definitions of encryption but these laws have also encountered problems due to the 
complexity of their definitions. Australia would do well to avoid these unnecessary 
problems and the ALRC’s recommendations recognize the benefits to be gained from a 
uniformed approach to data breach notification that covers all states and organizations. 
We agree with this general approach which is particularly supported by our research into 
encryption safe harbors.  
 
 
                                                          
103 Id. 
